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During the reporting period, the South Carolina Supreme
Court articulated the basic policy that the discovery devices of
state practice have limited application under adoption law.1 In
McDonald v. Berry,2 the attorney for the adopting parents was
not required to disclose their names or addresses to the natural
parents who had released the child for adoption and who pre-
sented no meritorious grounds for attacking the adoption de-
cree.3 Preventing harassment of the child and his adoptive
parents is the cornerstone of the decision. By way of dictum the
court discussed the attorney-client privilege. It was noted that
generally the identify of the client is not privileged while an
address given confidentially is a privileged communication.
In Cook v. Douglas,4 two passengers, mother and daughter, of
the first automobile involved in a collision brought separate
injury actions against the driver of the second automobile. The
defendant attempted to depose the mother as a witness to the
daughter's suit, and vice versa, under section 26-701 of the South
Carolina Code, 1962, providing for written depositions of any
witness to a civil action. After noting that sections 26-501
through 26-512 of the Code provide the exclusive method of ex-
amination of an "adverse party," the court held that mother and
daughter occupied the "inseparable and dual capacity of adverse
party and witness" due to their substantial "identity of interest
through separate suits based upon substantially the same cause
of action and involving identical facts." 5
B. Formal Requirement8
In Iick v. Carr,6 the court considered the defense of excusable
neglect 7 in relation to failure to answer or demur to a complaint
1. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1129 (1962) providing for issuance of amended
birth certificates for adopted children free from such notice; evidence said the
court of a general legislative policy. McDonald v. Berry, 243 S.C. 453, 456,
134 S.E.2d 392, 393 (1964).
2. McDonald v. Berry, supra note 1.
3. For a discussion of the new adoption law see the survey of Recent Legis-
lation and Wills and Trusts.
4. Cook v. Douglas, 243 S.C. 201, 133 S.E.2d 209 (1963).
5. Id. at 204, 133 S.E.2d at 210.
6. Irick v. Carr, 243 S.C. 565, 135 S.E.2d 94 (1964).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-609, -1213 (1962).
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within the twenty day statutory period.8 Default judgment had
been rendered against the defendant before he employed counsel.
On motion to vacate, defendant alleged that he had had no legal
training to inform him of the statute of limitations, that he was
emotionally upset by the illness of his mother (He was served
two days after returning from a five day visit with her in Mis-
sissippi.), and that he was bothered with pressing business prob-
lems. The South Carolina Supreme Court refused to disturb the
ruling of the lower court that these circumstances did not consti-
tute excusable neglect. The only cases in this area in recent years
involved errors made by attorneys in the conduct of a caseY The
court had, however, ruled in 1946 that pressing business obliga-
tions would not excuse a layman for failure to employ counsel. 10
Yet in 1914, the court had intimated that bad health and poor
memory would be a valid excuse." The instant case is therefore
a welcome definition of the layman's obligation to attend to his
legal business. In the past, the decisions have seemed to rest solely
upon how necessitous the circumstances of the layman appear.
Cochran v. City of Sumter 12 demonstrates that there must be
strict compliance with the statutes permitting suit against a
political subdivision of the state. The particular statute held to
bar this action required the filing of a verified claim within
ninety days of the date of injury.'3 The plaintiff's attorney had
notified the defendant of the claim twenty-seven days after the
injury through a letter to the city manager, after which they
continued in close contact on the matter. The court reasoned that
any suit against an immune governmental body is in derogation
of its sovereignty and must be within the enabling statute. The
unverified notice of claim was thus faulty.
The Cochran case appears to go beyond the precedents in this
area. Rushton v. South Carolina Highway Dep't14 approved this
type statute as necessary for notice to the governmental agency
to allow investigation while the facts were clear in the witnesses'
minds. The earlier case of Ancru v. South Carolina Highway
8. S.C CODE ANN. § 10-641 (1962).
9. Lee v. Peck, 240 S.C. 203, 125 S.E.2d 353 (1962); McGhee v. Chevy,
235 S.C. 37, 109 S.E.2d 713 (1960) ; Simon v. Flowers, 231 S.C. 545, 99 S.E2d
391 (1957).
10. Brown v. Nix, 208 S.C. 230, 37 S.E.2d 579 (1946).
11. Farmers Bank v. Talbert, 97 S.C. 74, 81 S.E. 305 (1913).
12. Cochran v. City of Sumter, 242 S.C. 382, 131 S.E.2d 153 (1963).
13. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 47-71 (1962).
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Dep't15 had simply granted a new trial on the best evidence rule
holding that the original complaint should be introduced into
evidence in preference to copies thereof. The policy decision of
the instant case may well prove to be the most important develop-
ment in pre-trial practice during the reporting period.
C. Parties
In Hardwick v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 16 the plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment as to the liability of the defendant, who
promptly demurred on a defect of parties. At the time of acci-
dent the plaintiff's borrowed automobile was insured by the
defendant through a policy with the third party owner. The
defendant was thus seeking to join the owner as well as the
plaintiff's insurer. The court held there was no defect of parties,
extending the distinction of proper as contrasted to indispensable
parties to this action for declaratory judgment.
The doctrine of indispensable parties remains a firmly estab-
lished part of South Carolina practice. The application of the
rule is primarily a question of the factual background of each
litigation. The test of Doctor v. Lee17 which is cited in the instant
case is very succinct: "[P]arties are not necessary to a complete
determination of a controversy unless they have rights which
must be ascertained and settled before rights of parties to the
suit can be determined."'' 8
D. Jurisdiction
In Clinkscales v. Clinkscales"- the circuit court for Anderson
County had awarded divorce with custody of children to the wife.
When the wife moved to Greenville, the husband brought action
in the circuit court for that county to take custody from her.
The wife questioned the jurisdiction of the latter court. The cir-
cuit court found jurisdiction under the statute fixing venue of
actions, generally, in the county of the defendant's residence.
20
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed holding that the
court issuing the divorce decree has exclusive jurisdiction on
questions of custody.
15. Ancrum v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 162 S.C. 504, 61 S.E. 98
(1931).
16. Hardwick v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 162, 133 S.E.2d 71 (1963).
17. 215 S.C. 332, 55 S.E.2d 68 (1949).
18. Id. at 335, 55 S.E.2d at 69.
19. 243 S.C. 377, 134 S.E.2d 216 (1963).
20. S.C. CoDE- ANN. § 10-303 (1962).
1965]
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The question was one of novel impression in South Carolina.
This policy seems well reasoned as a method of avoiding conflict
of jurisdiction. Its basis is section 20-115 of the South Carolina
Code, 1962, providing that the "divorce court may from time to
time after final judgment make orders touching the care, custody,
and maintenance of the children." Precedents of North Carolina
and Virginia operating under similar statutes were cited in
accord with the instant case.
E. Joinder
Gibbs v. Young2l demonstrates the difficulty faced by the
foreign plaintiff in attempting to gain redress against a foreign
corporation. The plaintiff, a California citizen, was injured in an
auto collision in Georgia with a truck owned by an Alabama
corporation and driven by a resident of Anderson County. The
corporation was licensed to operate through Chesterfield County,
and suit was brought against the individual and corporation in
Chesterfield. The South Carolina Supreme Court sustained the
demurrer as to the corporate defendant and granted change of
venue to Anderson County as to the individual. There was no
question as to jurisdiction over the resident of the state, but the
corporate defendant was protected by section 10-214 of the South
Carolina Code, 1962, limiting jurisdiction over a foreign corpo-
ration when sued by a foreign plaintiff to those actions arising
in the state or where the subject matter of the action is within
the state. The impact of the case is that the above limitation




Boyeston&v. BaxZey22 was a tort suit for personal injuries aris-
ing out of an automobile accident. The plaintiff could remember
nothing of the occurrence; both defendant and his passenger
were dead, and there were no other eye witnesses. The physician
who examined the body of the defendant testified that the major
injury was a broken neck which caused defendant's death. On
cross examination he admitted he could not be sure of the cause
of death without autopsy. There was no other evidence as to the
21. 242 S.C. 217, 130 S.E.2d 484 (1963).
22. 243 S.C. 281, 133 S.E.2d 796 (1963).
[Vol. 17
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cause of death. The South Carolina Supreme Court sustained the
trial judge's ruling that the defendant's counsel could not argue
to the jury that the defendant had died prior to the accident due
to a heart attack, pointing out that there was no evidence weigh-
ing against the inference that defendant had died in the col-
lision. The basis of the decision is the well tested rule that coun-
sel has a duty to confine his arguments to the issues raised by
the pleadings and evidence.
B. Judgments
The court's decisions in the area of Judgments were largely a
restatement of settled principles of law.
In Case v. Case,23 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
an order or decree of a trial judge is not final until written and
delivered to the clerk for filing. In this case appellant contended,
and the record supported his contention, that during the hearing
on the merits the trial judge orally declared that he would grant
plaintiff a divorce on the grounds of desertion. Plaintiff was
allowed to withdraw the divorce action-a portion of her de-
mand-with temporary relief continued. Defendant-appellant
here sought to have the trial judge's oral declaration made bind-
ing as a final order or decree. Mr. Chief Justice Taylor, writing
for the court, cited section 10-1510 of the South Carolina Code,
1962, which requires in part that: "Upon the trial of a ques-
tion of fact by the court its decision shall be given in writ-
ing..... ." The court also cited Archer v. Tong,24 in which the
court said: "Until the paper has been delivered by the judge to
the clerk of the court, to be filed by him as an order in the case,
it is subject to the control of the judge and may by him be with-
drawn at any time before such delivery." Accordingly, the court
held in the present case that: "Even if . . . the trial judge
granted an oral divorce to plaintiff, such pronouncement is not
a final ruling on the merits nor is it binding on the parties until
it has been reduced to writing, signed by the judge and delivered
for recordation."
In Brookline Say. & Trust Co. v. Barnett25 respondent Brook-
line had been assigned certain promissory notes given by ap-
pellants to a contractor for work done on their home. Subse-
quently, a revision note was given to Brookline by the Barnetts.
23. 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394 (1964).
24. 46 S.C. 292, 24 S.E. 83 (1895).
25. 243 S.C. 481, 134 S.E.2d 569 (1964).
1965]
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Judgment was obtained on the note and the circuit court en-
dorsed upon the execution, pursuant to section 34-62 of the South
Carolina Code, 1962, that "the judgment in this case was ob-
tained on obligations contracted for the erection of improvements
on homestead of defendants and for no other." The position of
appellants was that since the negotiable note was assigned and
renewals thereof taken, a judgment based upon the renewal note
could not be enforced against the homestead. They charged that
the circuit court erred in not so ruling. The South Carolina Su-
preme Court held, pursuant to article III, section 28 of the South
Carolina Constitution, and section 34-1 of the South Carolina
Code, 1962, that the homestead exemption is inferior to obliga-
tions contracted for the purchase, erection or improvement of the
homestead and that the judgment held by Brookline represented
the original debt incurred by the appellants for the making of
improvements or repairs to their residence, regardless of its as-
signment or renewal.
£. Discretion of Trial Judge
The court following settled rules, held in several cases that an
order for a new trial based upon a consideration of the facts is
not reviewable by the South Carolina Supreme Court,26 and that
the disposition of a motion for a new trial on grounds of the in-
adequacy of the verdict is discretionary with the trial judge and
will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse.27
However, in Hathell v. MoCracken2s the trial judge, having
determined that the verdict rendered by the jury was inadequate,
awarded damages higher than the amount given by the jury but
less than the amount prayed for by the plaintiff, without giving
the plaintiff option of a new trial. Defendant had indicated a
willingness to pay the higher amount but plaintiff appealed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, noting that this precise
question had not heretofore been before the court, held this to be
reversible error. The court noted as a general rule that a judg-
ment non obstante veredioto, in any amount greater than the
verdict of the jury, may be entered only when the evidence sup-
porting it is uncontradicted and unimpeached so that the verdict
could and should have been entered in the exact amount of the
26. Mack v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 243 S.C. 376, 133 S.E.2d 833 (1963); Lee v.
Kirby, 243 S.C. 185, 133 S.E.2d 127 (1963).
27. Daniel v. Hazel, 242 S.C. 443, 131 S.E.2d 260 (1963).
28. 243 S.C. 45, 132 S.E.2d 7 (1963).
[Vol. 17
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judgment. In this case, where the damages were unliquidated
and very much in dispute, the court held that even if the plain-
tiff were entitled to a directed verdict on all other issues, the
judge could not have directed a verdict for the amount of dam-
ages as this would be an invasion of the province of the jury.
The court quoted from Anderson '. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 20 to
the effect that: "Although the court may amend a verdict, the
amendment must be accompanied with an option of a new trial
nisi to the party against whom [the] amendment militates."
Otherwise it would compel the plaintiff to forego his constitu-
tional right to the verdict of a jury to allow such an amendment
to stand.
The last case to be considered in this area was that of Fore v.
United Ins. Co. of America3° in which a default judgment was
set aside by the trial judge pursuant to section 10-1213 of the
South Carolina Code, 1962. The court held that the appellant's
exceptions failed to point out any abuse of discretion by the trial
judge, the only ground upon which his order to vacate will be
set aside by the court when statutory requirements have been met
in the issuance of such an order.
III. APPEAL
A. Court Rules
The most interesting court rules decision handed down by
the court during this survey period was F.C.X. Co-op. Serv.,
Inc. v. Bryant.31 A close study of this case should prove ex-
tremely valuable to any attorney in that it should enable him
to avoid the pitfalls occasioned by improper preparation of
exceptions. In this case an action was brought to recover the
unpaid portion of the purchase price of certain farm supplies
sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant pursuant to
a written contract between the parties. In the trial court the
action resulted in a directed verdict for the plaintiff whereupon
the defendant appealed on twenty-two exceptions. In preparation
of his brief the defendant's attorney set out nineteen questions,
many of them repetitious. He failed to state under each sub-
division of his brief the specific exception which was alleged
29. 175 S.C. 254, 178 S.E. 819 (1935).
30. 242 S.C. 451. 131 S.E.2d 508 (1963).
31. 242 S.C. 511, 131 S.E.2d 702 (1963) ; see also Allen v. Georgia Industrial
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to raise the point considered under that subdivision. Motion was
made to dismiss on the ground that the defendant had not met
the requirements of the South Carolina Supreme Court Rules
No. 4, section 6 and No. 8, sections 2, 3, and 7. The court found
that the appellant had violated the letter and spirit of these rules
to such an extent as to unduly burden opposing counsel and the
court. The court, after having discussed the flagrant violations
of the rules and having failed to pass upon the plaintiff's motion
to dismiss, considered the exceptions on their merits and found
against the defendant. This avenue taken by the court illustrates
the fact that it is not bound by its own rules and may waive com-
pliance as a matter of grace.
The case of Allen v. HathelZ3 2 also set forth the court policy
of waiver of compliance with court rules. In this case the court
noted that it was a close question as to whether or not there had
been compliance with Rule 4. This being the case, the court relied
on language contained in Jackson v. Carter :83
If such examination of an exception as may be necessary to
disclose that it is framed in violation of this rule (e.g., Rule
4, Supreme Court Rule) also discloses that it clearly em-
braces a meritorious assignment of prejudicial error, the
court will ordinarily waive the breach of the rule and con-
sider the exception. Otherwise the exception will not general-
ly be considered.
The court went on to hold that although the exception did not
comply with Rule 4 literally, there was a meritorious assignment
of prejudicial error in the charge of the trial judge based upon
the evidence presented in the transcript and inferences drawn
therefrom by the court. This case is analogous to the F.C.X. case
in that the court in both instances waived compliance with one of
its own rules and considered the exceptions on their merits; how-
ever, the two cases differ in that the violation of the rule in the
Allen case does not appear to be as flagrant as in the F.C.X.
decision. There was also a difference in the result reached by
the court in these decisions in that in the Allen case the court
found that there was a meritorious assignment of error whereas
in the F.C.X. case the court upon consideration of the exception
failed to find any merit in any of the exceptions taken by the
appellant.
32. 242 S.C. 458, 131 S.E2d 516 (1963).
33. 128 S.C. 79, 121 S.E. 559 (1924).
[Vol. 17
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In Shell v. Brown 4 the court was again faced with the appli-
cation of Rule 4, section 6 but in a different content. In this
case a demurrer filed by the defendant in the lower court was
overruled. Defendant appealed, excepting "on the ground the
complaint failed to state a cause of action." The court in dis-
missing the appeal on the grounds of vagueness and indefinite-
ness quoted from Brady v. Brady :35
We have held in many cases that every ground of appeal
ought to be so distinctly stated that the court may at once
see the point which it is called upon to decide without hav-
ing to grope in the dark to ascertain the precise point at
issue.
The only other decision in this area was Sellars v. NicholsonP6
where the court found the appealing party had failed to file
return in the South Carolina Supreme Court within twenty days
as required by Rule 1. The court held that the circuit judge prop-
erly granted the respondent's motion for an order dismissing the
appeal where there had been a violation of the rule. The court in
conclusion said that the circuit judge had no alternative but to
grant the motion for the order, thus the court here refuses to
waive compliance with a court rule prescribing the time the
parties have to perfect an appeal.
B. Scope of Review
The case of Knight 'v. Johnson3 7 was the only case before the
court dealing with scope of review. The dispute involved an auto-
mobile collision. During the trial the defendant was allowed to
introduce testimony, over the objection of the plainitff, as to the
motive and purpose of the plaintiff in the operation of the auto-
mobile at the time of the accident. A verdict was rendered for
the defendant but on motion of the plaintiff a new trial was
granted upon the grounds that prejudicial error had been com-
mitted in the admission of such testimony and the defendant
appealed. On appeal the plaintiff contended that the order of
the trial court was not subject to review by the South Carolina
Supreme Court because the order was based on a question of fact,
thus it was not within the court's scope of review. The court,
34. 243 S.C. 380, 134 S.E.2d 214 (1963).
35. 222 S.C. 242, 72 S.E.2d 193 (1952).
36. 243 S.C. 340, 133 S.E.2d 837 (1963).
37. 244 S.C. 70, 135 S.E.2d 372 (1964).
19651
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speaking through Mr. Justice Lewis, agreed with the plaintiff
that it is a well settled rule recognized by the court that when the
order is based upon questions of fact or upon questions of law
and fact it is not appealable. However, the court went on to
point out that the order appealed from here was based solely
upon a question of law in that the trial judge's order stated that
in the admission of such testimony the court had committed
prejudicial error. The South Carolina Supreme Court then pro-
ceeded in the determination of the basic question on appeal and
found that the testimony introduced in the lower court was
admissible and the order granting the new trial was reversed
accordingly.
C. Law of the Case
After being remanded to the circuit court 38 the case of Cleve-
land v. Cleveland39 was once again before the South Carolina
Supreme Court for consideration. The court held that the circuit
court could not properly consider a question decided by a master
when no exception to the master's report had been taken.
The conclusions of the master, not being challenged by a prop-
er exception in this respect, became the law of the case.
In Bost v. Banker's Fire & Marine Ins. Co.4 0 the court held
that a trial judge's charge relating to a question of imputation
of knowledge, not having been excepted to, whether right or
wrong became the law of the case.
In the case of Hutson v. Herndon4 1 the trial court's ruling
that certain lease agreements were binding and not subject to
oral variance, was the law of the case and binding upon the South
Carolina Supreme Court since no appeal had been taken in the
earlier action.
Finally, in Dillon Tire Serv., Inc. v. Pope42 the court held
that an order issued by the circuit court holding that the in-
debtedness of the defendant to the plaintiff was not at issue
and from which no appeal was made became the law of the case.
D. Exceptions
Four cases dealing with exceptions will be discussed in this
subsection; Bob Jones Univ., Inc. v. City of Greenville43 is the
38. Clcveland v. Cleveland, 238 S.C. 547, 121 S.E.2d 98 (1961).
39. 243 S.C. 586, 135 S.E.2d 84 (1964).
40. 242 S.C. 274, 130 S.E.2d 907 (1963).
41. 243 S.C. 257, 133 S.E.2d 753 (1963).
42. 243 S.C. 293, 133 S.E.2d 813 (1963).
43. 243 S.C. 351, 133 S.E.2d 843 (1963).
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most significant. Here the appellant in his exceptions contended
that the master committed prejudicial error in his report by
failing to separately append thereto and identify all evidence
which he found inadmissible. Mr. Justice Moss, writing for the
majority of the court, found that the appellant failed to specify
in any of his exceptions any incompetent testimony that may
have been considered by the master or any evidence submitted
that the master should have considered but may not have done
so to appellant's prejudice. The court based its decision on a 1962
case.
44
What the majority of the court seemed to have overlooked,
and what Mr. Justice Bussey in his dissent pointed out, was that
the appellant through the master's failure was left totally in the
dark as to what evidence had been and had not been considered.
Any attempt by appellant to be more specific in his exceptions
would have amounted to mere speculation and conjecture on his
part.
In Hall v. Senn4 5 the court again held that an exception in
which no question of law or fact is set forth is too vague and
indefinite to be reviewed. The court went on to state that the
exception was not sufficient to challenge the legal sufficiency of
the findings of fact of the lower court in that the exceptions
failed to point out the claimed error committed by the court
below.
The case of Brown v. Graham4 6 dealt with the situation where
the master issued two reports. The plaintiff appealed to the cir-
cuit court only upon exceptions to the second report. The South
Carolina Supreme Court held that the lower court was correct
in excluding the earlier report.
An unusual situation arose in Allen v. Georgia Industrial
Realty Co.4 7 wherein the master based his findings upon four
different grounds, one of which was estoppel. The plaintiff on
appeal excepted to these findings but failed to set forth any ques-
tion in his brief challenging the master's findings of estoppel.
The South Carolina Supreme Court said in order to prevail on
the appeal, the plaintiff had to obtain a reversal of the master's
findings as to estoppel, without which any error in the other
findings became immaterial and moot. Since the plaintiff failed
44. Cox v. First Provident Corp., 240 S.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 1 (1962).
45. 242 S.C. 544, 131 S.E.2d 700 (1963).
46. 242 S.C. 491, 131 S.E.2d 421 (1963).
47. 242 S.C. 472, 131 S.E.2d 419 (1963).
1965]
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to set forth any question pertaining to the estoppel, his right to
insist that the court review the other findings of the master
was precluded.
RoxALD E. BOSTON
WILLIAM C. BOYD, III
REGINALD C. BRowN, JR.
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